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Climate Effects on Rainfall Index Insurance Purchase Decisions
By James L. Novak and Denis Nadolynyak
Introduction
Over the past decades, alternative crop yield and revenue insurance have been tried in an attempt
to increase participation rates and to lower the loss ratios.  Some programs were aimed at
reducing the moral hazard and adverse selection issues inherent in individual insurance contracts
and some tried to make contracts more efficient (cover larger portions of risks born by the
producer) by utilizing innovative products.  The two objectives are often in conflict as
exemplified by the tradeoff between the area-yield (Group Risk Product or GRP) and farm-level
(APH) yield insurance. Up until recently, none of these pilot designs were very successful
(Glauber, 2004).
One of the promising venues in the agricultural insurance design is index insurance which largely
avoids the moral hazard issues and is especially applicable for crops and areas with
limited/unreliable yield/revenue records.  While the GRP has been relatively successful, rainfall
index insurance has been showing promise where agriculture is more rainfall dependent and
reliable yield records are lacking (Skees, 2008).  In the United States, Rainfall Index (RI)
insurance and Vegetation Index insurance (VI) were offered as pilot programs starting 2007.
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Abstract
Rainfall Index (RI) insurance
provides forage and hay producers
with group risk protection against
drought related losses.  However,
insurance premiums and risk
protection are currently based on
pooled weather data series and do
not account for the impacts of
specific climate phases, specifically
the El Niño Southern Oscillation
(ENSO), on local rainfall
distribution. This analysis examines
differences in the expected payoffs
on the RI insurance under varying
coverage levels based on
probabilities of rainfall shortage
during specific climate events at four
Agricultural Experiment Stations in
Alabama.  Policy makers and
producers are expected to benefit
from the results that show the
varying effects of climate on
expected payouts from this
insurance.
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CSREES/USDA for conducting this research.RI is a pilot group risk insurance product offered to protect the
producers of hay and pasture in all or part of the 13 states currently
eligible against the occurrence of drought. States currently included in
this pilot program are all of Alabama, Montana, Colorado, Missouri,
and North Carolina and most counties in Virginia and South
Carolina.  Select counties included in other states are North Dakota,
Colorado, Oklahoma, Texas, Pennsylvania, and New York.  The Risk
Management Agency USDA states that this insurance is “primarily
intended for use by producers whose crop production tends to follow
the average precipitation or vegetation patterns for a 12x12 mile
precipitation grid according to historic rainfall patterns.”  Filling an
important niche, this product provides group risk insurance for hay
and forage producers.  As a single hazard group risk insurance,
indemnity payments are based solely on rainfall shortages from
averages during bimonthly time periods in a Grid.  The insurance does
not protect individual production shortages.  All producers
indemnified receive payment for losses in the Grid and not for
individual farm losses.  As a group risk product, no individual
production verification is required.  For the insurance, the production
year runs from February to January and indemnifies the bi-monthly
production periods February-March, April-May, June-July, August-
September, October-November, and December-January.
The RI premiums and potential indemnity payments are based on
average climatic conditions going back to 1948.  However, climate
research indicates that, in some areas of the U.S. and particularly in the
Southeast, cumulative rainfall distributions differ by what’s called the
El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) climate phase (El Niño, La
Niña, and Neutral). Consequently, the optimal level of insurance
protection for hay and forage production may depend significantly on
the ENSO phase.
This analysis examines the maximum expected payoff from the RI
insurance from hay production for two-month indemnity periods
based on cumulative probabilities of rainfall shortage during
alternative ENSO climate phases at four Alabama Agricultural
Experiment Stations.  The objective of the study is to determine
whether ENSO phases alter producer decisions with regard to when
and how much RI protection to purchase.  The results showing that
expected indemnity payoffs from insuring bi-monthly periods vary by
ENSO phase may be useful to policy makers and producers decisions.
Crop Production and ENSO Phase
The concept of rainfall and weather related index insurance has been
presented in Miranda, (1991), Skees, et al. (2001); and Martin, et al.
(2001) studies.  Although presented as a workable concept in these
papers, RI insurance was only introduced in the U.S. relatively
recently.  In Alabama, the insurance first became available in 2007.
Alabama, Texas, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia are
states currently cited as being strongly affected by the El Niño
Southern Oscillation.  The implications of this study for purchasing
RI insurance according to ENSO phase are especially relevant to these
states and for those cited in the Mjelde, Hill, and Griffiths (1998)
study as they are added to the RI program. 
The relationship between ENSO climate phases and agricultural
production in the southeastern U.S. has been well documented
(Baigorria et al., 2008; Hansen, Hodges, and Jones, 1998).  Mjelde, et
al. cite a correlation between U.S. weather parameters and ENSO
along the Gulf Coast and in the Northeastern, Southwestern, and
Northwestern regions of the country.  Gershunov (1998) examined
intra-seasonal impacts of ENSO on rainfall. Carriquiry and Osgood
(2008) examined the interaction of climate forecasts and index
insurance as a way to manage climates risk in agriculture in developing
countries.  Podesta, et al. (2002) highlighted the implications of the
ENSO phases for agricultural decision making in Argentina.  Khalil,
et al. (2007) examined ESNO phase impacts on rainfall and proposed
rainfall index insurance as protection against crop losses due to floods
in Peru.  Nadolnyak, et al. (2008) found differences in yield
distributions of cotton, corn and peanuts under different ENSO
phases in the southeastern U.S. and cited implications for actuarial
improvements in group risk insurance products through use of ENSO
phase data.  
Rainfall Index Insurance
RI insurance in the U.S. is a group risk insurance program that
protects hay and forage production in a 12 x 12 mile “Grid” against
shortages of rainfall during two-month “intervals” during a
production year.  For RI, the production year is divided into six
intervals for each Grid which starts with February-March and ends
with December-January.  Producers are required to indemnify at least
two Intervals and distribute a minimum of 10 percent and a
maximum of 50 percent of their crop acreage (forage, pasture, or hay)
in the indemnified periods.  More than two intervals may be
indemnified but not more than 100% of acreage can be insured in the
Intervals.  For simplification purposes and comparisons between
ENSO events only two Intervals per location will be highlighted in
this study.
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site 12 x 12 Grids were determined based on the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) data.  Average rainfall
values for forage and hay production in each Grid have been
converted to dollar denominated “County Base Values” (CBV) by the
Risk Management Agency (RMA) based on historic production for
that Grid.  Insurance “Coverage Levels” (CL) available to producers
for hay or forage protection range from 70 to 90 percent.  Producers
may adjust RI coverage within a Grid for their own acreage
productivity above or below average by multiplying dollar protection
levels by productivity factors ranging from 60 to 150 percent.
At the end of each two-month Interval, NOAA calculates a Final
Grid Index value (FGI) of rainfall for each Grid.  Payments are
triggered when the FGI value falls below the selected coverage level
chosen for an indemnified two month period.
Forage and hay production have different CBV’s which affects the
value but not the incidence of the indemnity.  In this analysis we focus
on hay production only.   Hay Grids insured under RI are modeled
using data from four Alabama Experiment Stations.  These sites
represent four distinct production regions: Coastal Plains (Fairhope,
Grid 38088); Wiregrass (Headland, Grid 37135); Piedmont
(Chilton, Grid 34882); and the Tennessee Valley (Belle Mina, Grid
33914).  Hay acreage at the four stations was assumed to be contained
within single Grids.  Historic rainfall and Grid data used in this
analysis are available at the URL http://prfri-rma-map.tamu.edu.
ENSO Phase and Climate 
ENSO phase (event) impact on climate occurs through complex
atmospheric interactions starting with Pacific Ocean temperature
changes (www.agroclimate.org).  El Niño is the ENSO phase in which
the ocean temperature is cooler than normal and La Niña is the
opposite.  The deviations from average ocean temperatures change
global atmospheric circulation affecting weather and climate patterns
in Alabama and other regions of the country.  Climatic effects from
specific ENSO events depend on the time of the year.  In the Gulf
Coast region, La Niña results in below normal rainfall in the winter
and spring seasons that are critical for moisture recharge and planting.
El Niño, on the other hand, results in above normal rainfall in winter
and spring and below normal rainfall during July-September.
In the southeastern U.S., ENSO effects are thought to weaken with
distance from the coast. Because of the increasing distance from the
coast and differences in production region, it is expected that
indemnity payments also vary for the four sites in Alabama.
ENSO and Rainfall Index Insurance
The question to be answered by this study is whether expected payoffs
from RI insurance for an Interval and Grid differ by ENSO phases.  If
there is a difference, the question is what Intervals provide highest
payoffs under distinct ENSO phases.
The RI insurance actuarial rates are set by the RMA/USDA and are
based on average climate data going back to 1948.  The ENSO impact
is not currently considered in setting the premium rates.  It is assumed
for this analysis that insurance rates will continue to be based on
pooled rainfall averages and not on ENSO-specific distributions.
However, ENSO phase forecasts of high accuracy
(www.agroclimate.org) often become available well before the
contract closing dates.  Thus, the objective of our analysis is to find
out whether producers could potentially use ENSO phase forecasts to
minimize the error of insuring the wrong two Intervals.  An
implication also exists for policy makers to base future rates on
specific ENSO phase if additional information results in net gains.
Method
Dollar Income Protection (DIP) levels net of insurance costs were
determined for each of the four locations selected for this study using
the Hay Premium costs and BCV’s determined by the USDA’s Risk
Management Agency.  Indemnity levels were calculated at 70 percent,
75 percent, 80 percent, 85 percent, and 90 percent Coverage Levels
(CL) and for 60 percent, 100 percent, and 150 percent Productivity
Factors (PF).  CL’s are based on 100 percent of average rainfall for a
12x12 mile Grid.  PF is a producer’s estimate of his or her deviation
from normal productivity for the Grid.  Calculations show that the
150 percent PF always resulted in the highest dollars of protection.
Since we are only examining differences in insured Intervals according
to ENSO phase, this paper only presents 150 percent PF to simplify
presentation of the results.
A “Total Base Coverage Level” (TBCL) for each of the four Grids was
determined by multiplying the Base County Value (BCV) of hay
acreage by the 150 percent PF to adjust for land quality.  RMA has
established Base County Values for hay land at all the four sites to be
$148.60 per acre resulting in the TBCL:
1.) TBCL= $148.60 x 1 acre x 150% PF = $222.90.
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Insurance Protection (DIP) available for the four locations.  That is:
2.) DIPi = TBCL x % Insurance CLi
for i defining the CL of 70 to 90 percent.
At 70 percent CL, this would mean $156.03 Dollars of Insurance
Protection ($222.90 x .70).  Table 1 lists the DIP levels estimated for
the alternative CL’s at the four Experiment Station sites.  These values
reflect the protection offered based the historic rainfall time series
from 1948.
Insurance Premiums
Intervals within a Grid are insured based on historic rain shortfall risk
for hay production.  This is reflected in the insurance premiums
charged per Interval based on all climate phases. The costs of the
premiums charged for the RI insurance are subsidized by the federal
government at 64 percent of the 70 percent and 75 percent, 59
percent of the 80 percent and 85 percent and 55 percent of the 90
percent Coverage Levels.
Insurance costs are calculated by multiplying the dollars of insurance
protection by the “Base Premium Rate” by the farmer’s share of the
insured acreage.  The Base Premium Rates are listed in Table 2.
Protection estimates calculated for this analysis assume a 100 percent
share to the producer.
Net Dollars of Insurance Protection
Net Dollars of Insurance Protection (after subsidies) for hay land were
estimated for the four Experiment Station sites.  These were
calculated as:
3.) Unsubsidized Premium (UPDij) = DIPi x 100% Share x Base
Premium Rate 
As estimated above, for Headland at a 70 percent Coverage Level for
example this would mean a DIP of $156.03.  The DIP multiplied by
producer’s share and then by the Base Premium Rate would require
the payment of an unsubsidized premium of $5.60 per acre.
$156.03 x 100% share x 3.59% = $5.60
The amount due from the producer would be net of the government
subsidy.
4.) Producer Premium Due (PPDij) = UPDij - (UPDij x Subsidy)
As an example, after applying a 64 percent subsidy, the amount due
from a producer would be $2.02 per acre for 70 percent CL at 150
percent of normal productivity (PF) in Interval I in Headland.
$5.60 x .64 subsidy rate = $3.58
$5.60 - $3.58 = $2.02 per acre
Finally, the resulting level of protection would be net of the PPD:
5.) Net DIPij = DIPij - PPDij
Where j = Intervals 1 to 6 at site i.  
For Headland at a 70 percent CL this would mean a Net DIP of:
$156.03 - $2.02 = $154.01 per acre.  
Net DIP’s for alternative Intervals for 150 percent PF at the study sites
did not vary greatly within coverage level for the four sites.  At the 70
percent CL Net DIP ranged from approximately $150 to $155
depending on the Interval.  For each increase of 5 percent in CL Net
DIP increased by approximately $10 per acre.
Probabilities of Loss and Payoff
The higher the probability of significant rain shortfall the more
compelling should be the case for purchasing RI.  Using Simetar
©,
probability density estimates of rainfall shortages for average climate
and then for distinct ENSO phases were developed for the four study
sites for each two-month Interval covered by RI insurance (NOAA
historic data http://prfri-rma-map.tamu.edu/).  Estimates of the
probabilities by which a Final Grid Index (FGI) would fall below
Coverage Levels (and by how much below) for all climate and the
distinct ENSO phases were used to determine potential payoffs from
the RI.
Interpretation of the dollar payoffs should not be confused with what
a producer might receive in any specific year.  The probabilities of
collecting on the insurance are generally lower than 50 percent (but
with some exceptions) for all intervals regardless of climate phase.
And, in fact, probabilities of collecting are indicated to be zero at
Headland during an El Nino for some Intervals and coverage levels.
Expected Values
Expected value of payoffs are calculated as the probability of
collecting on the insurance times the Net Dollars of Income
Protection.  As such, this number does not reflect what a producer
would actually receive each year but only the probability conditioned
protection offered for alternative Intervals and under alternative
climate conditions based on the historic data.
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maximum levels of Net DIP were estimated for all climate phases and
then for specific ENSO events.  These were estimated as:
6.) EV(NDIPijk) =   (Probability of RI less than CLijk)  x  (Net
DIPij)
For all i and j where k = ENSO phase.  
Expected values of the insurance over all ENSO climate phase are
shown in Tables 3 through 6.  
Results
There does not appear to be a consistent pattern of difference
between estimated expected payoffs from the insurance based on
averages over all climate events and individual ENSO events between
the four sites.  However within the sites differences do seem to exist
between the payoffs averaged over all climate events and specific
ENSO phases.   There are also cases where optimal indemnity periods
vary depending on CL. Tables 3-6 show the expected payoff results by
Coverage Level and Interval for the four study sites.  Table 7
summarizes these results.
At Belle Mina, the two indemnified Intervals with the highest payoff
based on all climate events are February-March and December-
January.  In contrast, examining the expected payoff during specific
ENSO phases shows that during a La Niña event the highest payoff
comes from indemnifying August-September and October-
November.  Payoffs based on Neutral year climate data varies
somewhat from the all climate results showing the highest returns
during February-March and October-November instead of
December-January.  El Niño results shows the highest expected
payoffs in April-May for 70 percent, 75 percent, and 80 percent
coverage and February-March for the 85 percent and 90 percent CL’s
and December-January for all CL’s.
Chilton results mirrors all climate phase results during Neutral years
and during August-September in a La Niña year.  The other optimal
indemnity period during a La Niña differs from the overall climate
result.  During an El Niño the highest expected payoff comes from
indemnifying April-May and October-November Intervals.
Fairhope results show that the two intervals with the highest expected
payoff based on all climate events are April-May and October-
November.  Specific climate phase results are consistent with the
overall climate expected payoff in October-November except in the
case of La Niña at a 70 percent CL.  During La Niña the optimal
payoff intervals are also consistent with the all climate results during
April-May.  Neutral year optimal intervals include June-July and El
Niño years August-September.  During an El Niño event, expected
payoffs are highest during August-September and the October-
November.
Headland results show all climate phase payoffs to be highest during
April-May and October-November.  La Niña and Neutral years results
agree with the overall optimal climate payoff results during October-
November.  The highest payoff interval during a La Niña event is
December-January but for the Neutral years it is June-July.  El Niño
specific results also list April-May as one of the highest payoff
intervals but splits results on the second highest payoffs between
December-January at 70 to 80 percent CL and August-September at
85 and 90 percent CL.
Conclusions
Differences shown in optimal expected returns between the specific
La Niña, Neutral and El Niño ENSO phases indicate that payoffs may
be higher if producers select periods to indemnify based on individual
climate phases, particularly during La Niña events.  The best two
intervals to indemnify based on specific ENSO phase vary, but not in
all cases will differ from indemnification based on the average of all
climate phase results.  A consistent result for all sites indicate that
during El Niño years, returns will be less than expected in comparison
to results obtained based on average rainfall over all climate events.
This is not unexpected in that El Niño years are often wetter than
normal during critical growth periods.
Expected payoffs differ by ENSO phase and specific ENSO phase
provides more accurate information on payoffs to managers than does
payoff based on the average climate (all ENSO phase) data used by
RMA.  Management decisions based on selecting specific ENSO
phase optimal Intervals in some cases increase expected payoffs and in
others show that the results may be less than expected.  Information
provided in this study should help managers condition their
expectations to more realistic expected results from the purchase of
this insurance.  Implications from this study also exist for setting
actuarial rates based on specific ENSO phase.
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Table 1.  Estimated total hay Dollar Income Protection (DIP) provided under alternative insurance Coverage Levels at 150 percent PF for all
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Table 2.  Premium rates for alternative intervals and study sites at alternative coverage levels2010 JOURNAL OF THE ASFMRA
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Table 3.  Expected payoff (EV) per acre by ENSO phase for Belle Mina2010 JOURNAL OF THE ASFMRA
32
Table 4.  Expected payoff (EV) per acre by ENSO phase for Chilton2010 JOURNAL OF THE ASFMRA
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Table 5.  Expected payoff (EV) per acre by ENSO phase for Fairhope2010 JOURNAL OF THE ASFMRA
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Table 6.  Expected payoff (EV) per acre by ENSO phase for Headland2010 JOURNAL OF THE ASFMRA
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Table 7.  Highest expected payoffs (EV) per acre for two indemnification periods